By: seeker of truth
In a series of appellate decisions issued in early 2025, Florida’s District Courts of Appeal have offered fresh guidance on how charges of resisting an officer—with or without violence—should be interpreted. The decisions demonstrate a consistent judicial focus on the officer’s conduct, the existence of lawful authority, and the constitutional boundaries of nonviolent resistance.
Legal Standard: Resisting Without Violence Requires Lawful Officer Conduct
In T.W., a Juvenile v. State of Florida, the court affirmed the juvenile’s adjudication of delinquency for resisting an officer without violence after the defendant refused to comply with verbal commands during an investigative stop. The court relied heavily on precedent from C.E.L. v. State, 24 So. 3d 1181 (Fla. 2009), which established that fleeing or failing to comply with commands during a lawful Terry stop can constitute resistance under §843.02, Florida Statutes.
The court emphasized that such resistance is criminal only if the officer is lawfully executing a legal duty. The opinion noted:
“Absent a lawful basis for the stop, the individual’s noncompliance may not support conviction under the statute.”
In Luders Croissy v. State of Florida, the defendant was similarly convicted under §843.02 for failing to comply during a controlled narcotics operation. The court’s opinion noted that Croissy’s refusal to respond to questions, combined with other indicators of coordination with a drug seller, supported both the initial detention and the subsequent conviction for resistance.
Resisting With Violence Hinges on Officer’s Lawful Authority
In Dorsey v. State, the defendant was convicted under §843.01 for resisting with violence. The court upheld the conviction, focusing on the officer’s actions, which included a stop based on a radio dispatch alert and observed behavior consistent with prior suspicious conduct. The opinion concluded that the stop was lawful and that the officer was clearly engaged in the lawful execution of duty at the time of the resistance.
The court specifically referenced State v. Walker, 993 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), to affirm that a defendant’s physical interference during a justified detention may elevate the offense from nonviolent resistance to a felony under §843.01:
“Resistance accompanied by any physical act—grabbing, shoving, even struggling to avoid being handcuffed—can support a finding of resisting with violence when the officer is acting lawfully.”
Stand Your Ground Defense Found Inapplicable to Officer Confrontations
One of the most notable developments came in State v. Alejandro Argerich, where the First DCA reversed a trial court’s dismissal of charges based on the Stand Your Ground defense (§776.032). Argerich had used force against officers conducting an involuntary mental health commitment under the Baker Act.
The trial court found that the officers were unlawfully detaining Argerich and granted immunity under Stand Your Ground. The appellate court reversed, noting that the statute expressly excludes immunity for individuals who use force against law enforcement officers engaged in official duties, even if those duties are allegedly being carried out unlawfully.
The court observed:
“While the legality of the Baker Act detention may be subject to challenge, the statutory language of §776.032(2) clearly withholds immunity where the victim of the force is a law enforcement officer acting in any official capacity.”
This decision aligns with a growing line of cases emphasizing that resistance to perceived unlawful police conduct must be challenged through the courts, not through physical force.
Probable Cause and Protected Speech: A Divided Court
In Markeith Thomas v. State, a majority of the panel upheld the conviction for resisting without violence, but a sharply worded dissent argued that Thomas’s actions were constitutionally protected speech and that there was no probable cause for his detention.
Judge Emas, writing for the dissent, asserted:
“The majority’s reasoning dangerously expands the bounds of criminal liability for expressive conduct, even where no physical threat or interference is present.”
The dissent also argued that Thomas’s language, while arguably confrontational, did not constitute “fighting words” or a true threat under Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). The dissent concluded that, absent articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the officer lacked authority to detain Thomas, and thus, any resistance could not form the basis of criminal liability.
Emerging Judicial Themes
A text analysis of the opinions reveals the following recurring concepts:
| Legal Theme | # of Opinions Referencing |
|---|---|
| Resisting without violence (§843.02) | 3 |
| Motion for judgment of acquittal | 3 |
| Lawful execution of duty | 3 |
| Resisting with violence (§843.01) | 2 |
| Reasonable suspicion | 2 |
| Probable cause | 2 |
| Stand Your Ground (§776.032) | 2 |
These themes indicate a strong judicial preference for upholding resisting charges where officers are engaged in clearly lawful activity—but also a willingness to scrutinize questionable detentions or force when raised on appeal.
Conclusion
Recent Florida appellate decisions reinforce that resisting an officer—whether with or without violence—requires a foundation of lawful police conduct. The courts are applying clear boundaries around what constitutes “official duty” and are increasingly willing to strike down resistance charges when the underlying detention is unsupported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause.
However, the decisions also reaffirm that force against officers, even in contested circumstances, is unlikely to be protected by self-defense statutes such as Stand Your Ground. The appropriate venue for challenging perceived police misconduct, the courts have reiterated, is through judicial review—not through confrontation on the street.
Seeking Truth 